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Abstract
The aim of this study was to analyze the absence of adjustment of insulin doses in type 1 diabetic patients with poorly controlled diabetes.
Twenty-eight patients (HbA1c higher than 8.5% during the last 6 months, performing at least three capillary blood glucose determinations
per day), completed a questionnaire on the degree of confidence in their own knowledge, the nature of their health beliefs, their fear of
hypoglycemia, their own appreciation on how they adjust their insulin doses (subjective score). An analysis of their diabetes logbook
provided an objective score of the adjustment of doses actually performed. The results show that the subjective and objective scores
of adjustment were not significantly correlated. Further there was a significant negative correlation between the score of uncertainty on
knowledge and the subjective score of adjustment of the insulin doses, but not with the objective score. There was a significant correlation
between the score of positive health beliefs and the subjective score of adjustment of the insulin doses, but not with the objective score. No
correlation was found between the score of fear of hypoglycemia and the subjective score of adjustment of the insulin doses. Correlation
with the objective score was higher, but not significant. Actually, the fear of hypoglycemia was the most frequently given reason for not
adjusting the insulin doses, when the question was asked to the patients with an open answer. This study illustrates the difference between
thinking and doing. It also shows that the degree of confidence in one’s own knowledge, the health beliefs, and the fear of hypoglycemia
differently influence the perception that the patients have of their behavior, and what they really do.
© 2004 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The objective of the health care provider in the treatment
of type 1 diabetes is to obtain the best metabolic control in
order to avoid long-term complications, while avoiding the
occurrence of severe hypoglycemic episodes, and protecting
the quality of life [1]. To these ends, patients are required to
perform injections of insulin and measures of capillary blood
glucose concentration several times a day. They learn how
to realize these different tasks through educational programs
provided by the health care team. Besides these tasks, they
are taught appropriate responses to apply to some situations
and how to put them into practice: for example, daily mod-
ification of the insulin doses to maintain glycaemia within
limits defined by the medical team, or carrying sugar with
them to correct for hypoglycemia [2].
The adjustment of the insulin doses requires complex rea-
soning taking into account the results of the insulin doses in-
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jected in the previous days, glycaemia at the time of injecting
insulin, and the prediction of physical activity in the follow-
ing period of the day. This complexity was highlighted both
by the health care team and by the patients [3,4]. Clearly,
reasoning is not enough. It must be followed by an actual ap-
plication of the decision to change, or not, the insulin dosage.
Unfortunately, a large number of patients never adjust their
doses of insulin while their blood glucose levels are high,
accounting in part for elevated glycated hemoglobin. This
increases the risk for the development of long-term com-
plications. This absence of adjustment of the insulin doses
often occurs while other tasks such as injecting insulin, self
blood glucose monitoring, and even the recording of the data
in a diabetes logbook, are accomplished correctly [5,6].
Several causes may underlie this behavior. A failure of
the therapeutic education: patients do not adjust the insulin
doses because they did not learn how to do it or because they
did not understand the rules which were explained to them,
or because they are not sure enough of their knowledge, un-
certainty entailing indecision [7,8]. Further, in fact, it is clear
that the therapeutic education of the patients is not restricted
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to a transmission of knowledge, but is also aimed to elicit
behaviors from the patients [2]. The absence of adjustment
of the insulin doses, in this frame, does not involve only
cognitive factors, but may also be related to the following
different reasons. A first concerns the patient’s health beliefs
[9], leading him/her, for example, to think that it is useless
or impossible to try to normalize glycaemia, or the belief
that insulin causes weight gain, or the belief that he/she does
not know enough to be successful. A second one is due to
the fear of hypoglycemia, so that the patient may prefer to
leave this responsibility to the health care provider; indeed,
severe hypoglycemia is the most feared complication of dia-
betes [10]. Another one is the lack of motivation, the patient
refusing to spend time in the self-management tasks, or the
simple fact that the repeated tasks bore the patient.
The aim of this study was therefore to examine the reasons
for the absence of adjustment of insulin in type 1 diabetic
patients with poorly controlled diabetes. This study used on
one hand a questionnaire evaluating cognitive and behavioral
items, and on the other hand examined the patient’s own
diabetes logbook to estimate the actual adjustment of the
insulin doses.
2. Methods
Twenty-eight patients, followed by one of us (G.R.) for
at least 5 years, who had a mean glycated hemoglobin level
higher than 8.5% during the 6 months preceding the study,
who measured their glycaemia at least three times a day,
agreed to participate in this study. Table 1 represents the
demographic of the patients and the main characteristics of
their diabetes.
2.1. Questionnaire
The patients received a questionnaire during a medical
visit, and it was clear that their answers would not be com-
municated to their diabetologist, in order not to bias their
answers. They communicated their answers during a phone
call (15–60 min) with one of us (A.Z). One of the purposes
Table 1
Characteristics of the patients
N Mean Range
Male/female 11/17
Family history of diabetes 29%
Presence of retinopathy 36%
Presence of a nephropathy 4%
Presence of hypertension 20%
Age (years) 33 ± 14 18–68
Diabetes duration 16 ± 9 6–40
HbA1c (%) 9.4 ± 0.9 8.2–12.1
Injections of insulin per day 3.8 ± 0.6 2–5
Blood glucose determinations per day 3.8 ± 0.9 3–6
Visits with the diabetologist per year 5.5 ± 3.0 2–15
of the call was to make sure that the questionnaire had been
fully completed. In addition, an objective analysis of the
adjustments of the insulin doses was done (see below) on
photocopies of the pages of the logbook covering the three
previous months.
The questionnaire contained, besides the demographic
questions (Section 1, Table 1), 61 true/false questions and
one open-ended question, put at the end of questionnaire
(“why do you avoid to increase your insulin dose while
your blood glucose levels are high?”). Closed questions
were organized in several sections: the Section 2 (30 ques-
tions) aimed to determine the level of knowledge of the pa-
tients by proposing a sentence of the type “hypoglycemia
can be caused by too much insulin. True-false”, or “If,
when you wake up, glycaemia is lower than 5.5 mmol/l, you
should decrease the dose of insulin injected in the evening.
True-false”. Subjects were asked to add a confidence degree
to their answer [7,8], indicating whether they were sure of it
at 2% (not at all sure), 10% (not sure), 25% (weakly sure),
50% (does not know), 75% (rather sure), 90% (sure), 98%
(completely sure). There were 14 propositions concerning
theoretical aspects, 3 questions on practical tasks and 13
questions concerning practical knowledge, given in a ran-
dom order. Section 3 of the questionnaire (11 questions)
concerned the health beliefs, for example “You can act ef-
fectively to improve your health” with a gradation of pos-
sible answers according to a Lickert’s scale (total or partial
disagreement, partial or total agreement) [11]. Section 4 (10
questions) concerned hypoglycemia, for example “Do you
carry some sugar with you?”, “Did you experience a hy-
poglycemia episode for which the intervention of another
person was necessary?”, the answers being also organized
according to a Lickert’s scale in four levels. Section 5 (10
questions) grouped questions concerning time devoted to the
self-management (five questions), and the possible existence
of smoking (two questions). Finally, the last three questions
indicated to the patients “that their aim is to clarify whether
you really practice the adjustment of the insulin doses: they
do not test your knowledge, but what you do really”. For ex-
ample: “In case of hypoglycemia, do you really decrease the
dose of insulin which covers the period when it occurred?”
(possible answers: never, rarely, mostly, always).
From the answers to these questions, the following scores
were established: (i) subjective score of the adjustment of
the insulin doses; (ii) score of positive health beliefs; (iii)
score of knowledge uncertainty, established on the whole
set of knowledge questions, and by distinguishing knowl-
edge related to theoretical or practical notions; according to
[7,8,12–14], this score was established by giving for each
question a score of 0 (when confidence is sure at 98 or 90%)
and 1 (tendency to uncertainty) if the answer was equal or
lower than 75% of certitude; (iv) score of clarity of expla-
nations provided by the health care providers; (v) score of
constraint due to the time devoted to treatment, (vi) score
of fear of hypoglycemia. These scores were obtained by
adding the values given on the respective Lickert’s scales.
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Concerning the open question, we used the content analysis
methodology described by Gravitz [15].
The second part of the study consisted in an objective
analysis, of the pages of the logbook for the previous 3
months, and in establishing an objective score of adjustment
of the insulin doses actually practiced by the patients, as
I = b/a+d/c (possible value between 0 and 2), where (a) is
the number of capillary blood glucose determinations higher
than 10 mmol/l at the time of rapid insulin injection, not
preceded by a hypoglycemia episode, (b) is the number of
cases where these high blood glucose levels were followed
by an increase in the dose of rapid acting insulin; (c) is the
number of weeks where the average glycaemias at wake up
was higher than 10 mmol/l without nocturnal hypoglycemia;
(d) is the number of weeks where these high average gly-
caemias entailed an increase in the dose of intermediate or
slow action insulin injected in the evening.
2.2. Data analysis
All results in text and figures are given as mean±S.E.M.
In the analysis e correlation coefficient of Spearman are
used. For 28 subjects, a level of statistical significance of
P < 0.05 is obtained for r > 0.317, and P < 0.01 is
obtained for r > 0.432.
3. Results
3.1. Adjustment of the insulin doses: subjective and
objective scores
The subjective score of adjustment of the insulin doses
was obtained by asking the patients whether they thought
that they adjust their insulin doses, while the objective score
was calculated by analyzing the logbook of treatment. They

















Fig. 1. Correlation between the objective and subjective scores of adjustment of the insulin doses (NS). The horizontal and vertical lines give the median
values of scores.
were 21± 3 (range 14–27, median 21, the highest possible
score being 31) and 0.68 ± 0.52 (range 0 to 1.84, median
0.65, a perfect adjustment would have given a score of 2),
respectively. The two scores were not significantly correlated
(r = 0.254, NS) (see Fig. 1). The dispersion of points on
this figure shows that there were nine patients out of 28 who
either claimed that they adjusted the insulin doses (subjective
score superior to the median 21) while actually they did
not do it (objective score lower than the median 0.65), or
that they thought that they did not adjust their insulin doses,
while they actually did it.
3.2. Cognitive aspects of the adjustment of the
insulin doses
The percentage of questions for which the patients an-
swered that they were not sure of their answer (below or
equal to 75% of certitude) was 36 ± 27% (range 0–93%).
There was a strong correlation between the score of uncer-
tainty expressed as the percentage of questions for which the
patients declared to be uncertain, concerning practical and
theoretical knowledge (y = 1.05x + 7.96, r = 0.892), the
slope close to 1 suggesting that the degree of uncertainty on
the two types of knowledge was identical.
The degree of uncertainty was negatively correlated to
the clarity of explanations, the correlation being statistically
significant (P < 0.05) for the whole set of questions (r =
0.430) and practical questions (r = 0.465), and close to
the statistical significance (r = 0.315) for the theoretical
questions.
3.3. Uncertainty on knowledge and subjective score of
adjustment of the insulin doses
There was a significant negative correlation (r = 0.41,
P < 0.05) between the subjective score of insulin and the
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score of uncertainty on knowledge, calculated on the whole
set of tested knowledge. By contrast, this correlation was not
found with the objective score of adjustment of the insulin
doses (r = 0.27, NS).
3.4. Health beliefs, adjustment of the insulin doses, time
considered as a constraint, and degree of uncertainties on
knowledge
The mean score of positive health beliefs was 21.9± 2.7
(the highest possible score being 28). There was a significant
correlation (r = 0.387, P < 0.05) between the subjective
score of adjustment of insulin and the score of positive health
beliefs. On the other hand, no correlation was found between
the objective score of adjustment of insulin and the score
of positive health beliefs (r = 0.223, NS). A significant
negative correlation (r = −0.385, P < 0.05) was also found
between a score indicating that the patient considers time
devoted to the treatment as a constraint and the score of
positive health beliefs. On the other hand, no correlation
was found between the score of positive health beliefs and
the score of uncertainty concerning the whole set of tested
knowledge (r = 0.05, NS).
3.5. Fear of hypoglycemia and absence of adjustment of
the insulin doses
No correlation was found between the subjective score of
adjustment of insulin and the score of fear of hypoglycemia
(r = 0.05, NS). Correlation with the objective score was
higher, but not reaching statistical significance (r = 0.24,
NS).
3.6. Carrying sugar to treat hypoglycemia
Carrying sugar correlated significantly (r = 0.336) with
the score of positive health beliefs, but neither with the fact
of having experienced mild (r = 0.13, NS), or severe (r =
0.08, NS) episodes of hypoglycemia, nor with the subjective
(r = 0.01, NS), or objective (r = 0.10, NS), scores of
Table 2
Categorization of the answers to the question asked in an opened way:
why do you avoid you to increase your dose of insulin while your blood
glucose levels are high (some of the patients gave more than one answer)
Given motive Number of patient %
Fear of hypoglycemia 12 37.5
Gain weight 6 18.8
Difficult management of activities 3 9.4
Incomprehension 3 9.4
Negligence 3 9.4
Exceptional events 2 6.3
Family (fear of hypoglycemia) 1 3.1
It is a medical decision 1 3.1
Denial of the disease 1 3.1
Total 32 100
adjustment of the insulin doses. Correlation with the fear of
hypoglycemia, although higher, did not reach the statistical
significance (r = 0.24, NS).
3.7. Result of the question with opened answers
Table 2 represents the motivations given by the patients
when one asked them to clarify the reason for which they
did not increase their insulin doses while their blood glucose
determinations are high. The fears of hypoglycemia and of
gain weight appear as the most frequent reasons.
4. Discussion and conclusion
We recently suggested [5] to consider any therapeutic task
as a voluntary action which can be analyzed according to
the causal theory of action developed by Davidson [15]. Ac-
cording to this theory, one does something when one has a
reason to do it, and this reason is a pro-attitude, made of a
desire (for example here the desire to avoid in the long term
the complications of diabetes) and of a belief (for example,
the belief that the fact of increasing the dose of insulin when
glycaemia is high goes in this direction). Thus the fact of
not adjusting the insulin doses (an example of therapeutic
non-observance) can also be considered as a voluntary ac-
tion, caused by the conjunction of a desire—for example to
avoid hypoglycemia, to avoid weight gain—and the belief
that the fact of not increasing the dose of insulin, even when
glycaemia is high, belongs to the actions which will accom-
plish this desire [5]. Together with desires and beliefs other
mental states intervene, described as propositional attitudes,
such as emotions (fears, regrets, shames, etc. . . . ) which, as
desires and beliefs, have a content. These attitudes can lead
to an assertion (the statement of the contents of the attitude)
or, concerning beliefs, to an assent (the aware and volun-
tary acceptance of the content of the belief), and finally to
an action [16]. As discussed by Engel [16], the assertion of
the content of a belief is neither a necessary condition for
the existence of this belief (one can believe a matter without
ever expressing it), nor a sufficient condition (one can ex-
press a proposition without believing in it). Thus, if a subject
acts according to a certain belief, without expressing it, this
means that he nevertheless gave his assent to the content of
this belief. On the other hand, the assent, as the assertion,
is not a condition sufficient for the action, (one can approve
the content of a belief without ever putting it into practice),
nor necessary (one can act without approving the content of
the belief which is behind this action).
4.1. Discussion
According to this novel conceptual framework, we will
consider that the fact of actually adjusting the insulin doses
or not, or of carrying pieces of sugar or not, represent two
types of actions. By contrast, phenomenologically, thinking
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that one adjusts the insulin doses, having with more or less
certitudes some knowledge, having positive health beliefs or
not, being afraid of hypoglycemia, represent propositional
attitudes.
Thus, in order to know the content of one of these atti-
tudes, for instance whether a patient believes that it is good
to adjust the insulin doses according to the results of the
measures of the glycaemia, the best is not to ask him whether
he/she believes it, or whether he/she believes that he/she puts
this idea into practice, but to look in his/her logbook of treat-
ment whether he/she did it actually. Indeed, as illustrated by
this study the fact that one believes, and that one expresses
the content of the belief, that one adjusts the insulin doses
(subjective score), does not imply that one does it really (ob-
jective score) and inversely. Indeed, the first result of this
study was the absence of statistically significant correlation
between the subjective and objective scores of adjustment
of the insulin doses. This absence of correlation can be due
to the small number of subjects because there seems to be a
trend (see Fig. 1), or to the fact that the methods of evalua-
tion of two scores are not precise enough. However, it may
also suggest that there is really a difference between think-
ing that one adjusts the insulin doses and actually doing it.
The second result of this study concerned our patients’
knowledge uncertainty. For these 28 patients, the percentage
of questions for which they were not sure of their answer
varied from 0 to 93%. However, there was a strong corre-
lation between the percentages concerning theoretical ques-
tions and practical questions, although they were asked in
a random order: in other words, some patients doubt about
everything, and others do not doubt about anything. As ex-
pected, the degree of uncertainty was significantly correlated
in a negative way to the representation by the patients of the
clarity of the explanations which had been given to them.
According to the general conceptual framework used
herein, knowledge uncertainty may be considered as an
indicator of the strength of a propositional attitude. We ob-
served that it can be correlated with the subjective feeling
which the patients have to adjust the insulin doses, which
is another propositional attitude, but not necessarily trans-
lated into an action, the fact of adjusting really the insulin
doses, estimated by the objective score. Indeed, the more
the patients were uncertain in their knowledge, the lower
was their subjective score of adjustment of their insulin
doses. This correlation was however not significant when
the objective score of adjustment of the insulin doses was
concerned, suggesting that uncertainty on knowledge had
an influence on the representation that the patients have
of their capacity to decide the dose of insulin, but not on
their ability to do it actually. The absence of correlation
between knowledge uncertainty and the objective score
of adjustment of the insulin doses could suggest that the
patients, when they adjust their insulin doses, do not use
in fact “knowledge” which was taught to them to adjust
the insulin doses, but rules which they learnt by them-
selves. There may be here an analogy with other problem
solving situations, such as car driving, or chess playing
[17].
The same effect can be observed for another propositional
attitude, the positive health beliefs: as expected, they were
found significantly correlated to the subjective score of ad-
justment of the insulin doses, but not to the objective score.
Consistent with what one may expect intuitively, the score of
positive health beliefs was significantly correlated in a neg-
ative way to the score estimating the constraint represented
by the time devoted to the treatment, and in a positive man-
ner to the fact of carrying sugar to treat hypoglycemia, this
last item being not explained by past experiences of severe
hypoglycemic episodes (maybe because the fact of carrying
sugar prevented the occurrence of such accidents).
By contrast, there was no correlation between the fact of
carrying sugar and the subjective score of adjustment of the
insulin doses or the objective score. Similarly, a total lack of
correlation was found between the score of positive health
beliefs and the score of knowledge uncertainty, suggesting
that mental states examined in these analyses are completely
independent.
The last, but not least interesting, results concerned the
fear of hypoglycemia. While, in an opened question, the fear
of hypoglycemia emerged as the first cause expressed by the
patients to explain the absence of adjustment of the insulin
doses, the analysis of the questionnaire with true/false an-
swers did not show any correlation between the score of fear
of hypoglycemia, neither with the subjective score of adjust-
ment of the insulin doses, nor with the objective score. This
may represent an example where a reason, here an emotion,
given by an agent to explain a behavior, may not have actu-
ally a strong effect, neither on the representation of his/her
action, nor on what he/she actually does.
4.2. Practice implications
Educational diagnosis, the first step of any educational
process [18], is aimed to explore, for a given topic, the
content of these different “mental states”, or propositional
attitudes, of the patient. In conclusion, with all the limits
of a study which concerns only 28 subjects treated by the
same physician, data presented herein suggest that it may
not only be necessary, in the framework of this educational
diagnosis, to know about a given subject what the patients
believe, wish, are afraid of, regret, etc., but also to evaluate
the reality of their actions. Indeed, as shown in this study,
there is a difference between what the patients claim, or
even think, that they do, and what they actually do, as well
as that there is a difference between the expressed, and the
real, motivations of their actions.
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